The report refers to 'Scottish' and 'British' forces: Scotland is part of Great Britain and Scottish Regiments are part of the British Army.
The British Platoon House strategy was very much forced on them by local Afghan government pressure and wasn't the British preference. The limited size of the British contingent (under 4000 troops in 2006) was not suited to this and very small British forces soon found themselves under siege all over Helmand. To a degree this still appears to be an issue. For example, RE: Garmsir, this article provides an interesting perspective on the numbers game and multi-national cooperation: 4000 US Marines moved into the town in July 2009 to relieve a very small British force: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/we-pity-the-brits-the-view-from-the-marines-178209 .html
"[T]he clean shaven, fastidiously polite Marines landed ... to be greeted by the sight of a bunch of "bad ass" troops in shorts and flip flops, long adapted to this searingly hot, harsh environment. ....Lieutenant Colonel Christian Cabaniss, the commanding officer of 2/8, praised the British efforts.
'From my perspective, they were doing all the right things,' he said. 'They knew what they should do, they just didn't have the resources to do it. The plan we executed on 2 July had been done before but in pieces. We just had the resources to execute it all at the same time and stay. That is the difference."
The whole issue seems to be with resources. Even with the huge surge of US Marines into Helmand there doesn't seem to be the force:Population ratios needed for successful counterinsurgency.